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Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone
Layer and the Structure of International
Environmental Lawmaking
By DAVID D. CARON*
I. INTRODUCTON
As concern for the global environment grows, there is both under-
way and planned a flurry of international environmental lawmaking ef-
forts. Protection of the stratospheric ozone layer is an area in which
there already has been a relatively large amount of lawmaking activity.
This Article in Part I briefly reviews the stratospheric ozone depletion
problem and the history of the international community's response to
that threat. This review and history has been treated extensively and
competently elsewhere.' In this sense, it is not the purpose of Part I to
duplicate such work, but rather to provide the reader with an apprecia-
tion of the concerns and trends that have marked the community's re-
sponse. Part II provides a restatement of the regime for the protection of
the stratospheric ozone layer as it presently exists under the 1985 Vienna
Convention,2 the 1987 Montreal Protocol,3 and the 1990 London Adjust-
ments and Amendments to that Protocol.' Finally in Part II, I briefly
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Dr. Jur. 1990, Drs. 1985,
Leiden University; Dip. 1984, Hague Academy of International Law; J.D. 1983, School of
Law (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley; M.Sc. 1980, University of Wales Center
for Marine Law and Policy; B.S. 1974, U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
This Article on the current status of the international regime for the protection of the
stratospheric ozone layer was solicited by the Annuaire Frangais de Droit International and
published in French as La protection de la couche d'ozone stratosphdrique et la structure de
l'activitd normative internationale en matire d'environnement, 36 ANNuAIRE FRANAis DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL (1990) (forthcoming).
1. See, &g., S. ROAN, OZONE CRasis: THE 15-YEAR EVOLUTION OF A SUDDEN GLOBAL
EMERGENcY (1989).
2. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar.
22, 1985, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.53/Rev.1, at 11 (1985), S. TREATY Doc. 9, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
Sept 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. 10, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 LL.M. 1550
(1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
4. Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
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reflect on what the community's experience with the ozone depletion
problem tells us concerning the evolving structure of lawmaking in the
international environmental area.'
H. STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION: THE
PROBLEM AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
A. The Stratospheric Ozone Layer and The Theory That It Could Be
Depleted 6
A diffuse layer of ozone7 in the upper reaches of our atmosphere has
shielded life on the planet from ultraviolet radiation 8 for millions of
years. A seemingly unrelated event in 1928 was the development of
chiorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by Dupont chemists. These extremely sta-
ble and consequently long-lived substances were hailed as technological
triumphs. If one recurrent theme in the effort to protect the ozone layer
is uncertainty as to the reality or extent of a threat, then it is noteworthy
that for almost fifty years after the discovery of CFCs, the community
was ignorant of the threat CFCs posed and, as a consequence, focused
only upon the benefits they accorded. CFCs came to be used in a multi-
tude of ways, and the amount and types of CFCs utilized grew dramati-
cally, first after the World War II and again in the late 1960s.1
In 1974 however, two scientists postulated that these stable sub-
Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme (Agenda Item 7), U.N. Doe. UNEP/
OzL.Pro.2/3, Annex 11 (1990) [hereinafter London Amendments].
5. See also P.H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERN-
ANCE (1990) (addressing innovations in standard setting and implementation).
6. For a succinct description of the problem, see Rowland, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion
by Chlorofluorocarbons, 19 AMBiO 281 (1990); Gribbin, The Ozone Layer, NEw SCIENTIST,
May 5, 1988, Inside Science No. 9, at 1.
7. Ozone is an unstable gas composed of three atom oxygen molecules, which tends to
break down into the two atom oxygen molecules which we breathe. Ozone nonetheless exists
in the stratosphere because ultraviolet radiation (from which we are shielded by the ozone
layer) creates ozone by breaking apart diatomic oxygen. This ozone eventually returns sponta-
neously to its more stable two atom configuration. But amidst this cycle there is a resultant
layer of ozone. Crucially important to one's understanding is the fact that the ozone layer
operates as a shield even though the concentration of ozone is only about one molecule in
every 100,000. The concentration is so small that human activities have the potential to dis-
rupt it.
8. Light from the sun covers a range of energies. Light which appears blue to the human
eye, for example, is more energetic than fight that appears red. Ultraviolet light, with
wavelengths from below 200 nanometers up to 350 nanometer. and not visible to the human
eye, is highly energetic and, consequently, harmful to life.
9. CFCs have been used as propellants for aerosols, refrigerants, solvents for the cleaning
of electronic components, and the manufacture of rigid and flexible foams.
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stances, for the most part, ultimately reached the stratosphere; that once
there, they finally became exposed to the ultraviolet radiation from
which they had been shielded by the ozone layer, that this highly ener-
getic radiation broke down the CFC molecule, releasing chlorine atoms;
and that such chlorine atoms then served as catalysts in reactions which
broke down ozone molecules.' 0 It was estimated that each chlorine atom
released could destroy 100,000 ozone molecules, ultimately depleting the
ozone layer and exposing the planet to increased harmful ultraviolet
radiation. "
Two responses to this theory quickly emerged. Some experts
pointed to the dangers of failing to act quickly to protect the ozone layer.
Others pointed to the costs of acting precipitously on the basis of a con-
tested and yet unproven hypothesis. This confrontation became a key
characteristic of the debate regarding CFCs and ozone depletion for most
of the decade that followed. Moreover, because the issue became a clash
of experts which was not accessible to laypeople, there was a lack of
shared knowledge concerning the problem that in many ways foreclosed
broader public participation.
B. The Focus on Aerosols: 1974 to 198112
Public debate regarding regulation initially focused upon the use of
CFCs as propellants in aerosols, a use that clearly resulted in releases of
CFCs into the atmosphere. Not without difficulty, a number of states,
including the United States,13 Canada, and Sweden, 14 moved toward na-
tional bans on such aerosols. These efforts at unilateral action added new
characteristics to the debate. First, the concern arose in U.S. governmen-
tal circles that these unilateral efforts might be counterproductive in that
10. Molina & Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom-Cat-
alyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). See also Stolarski & Cicerone, Strato-
spheric Chlorine" A Possible Sink for Ozone, 52 CAN. J. CHEMISTRY 1610 (1974).
11. As to the potential harmful effects of increased ultraviolet radiation, see Emmett,
Health Effects of Ultraviolet Radiation, 1 EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE
AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 129 (J.G. Titus ed. 1986) [hereinafter 1 STRATOSPHERIC OZONE];
Waxier, Ozone Depletion and Ocular Risks from Ultraviolet Radiation, in 1 STRATOSPHERIC
OZONE, supra at 147; Teramura, Overview of Our Current State of Knowledge of UVEffects on
Plants, in I STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, supra, at 165; Worrest, The Effect of Solar UV-B Radia-
tion on Aquatic Systems: An Overview, in 1 STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, supra, at 175.
12. For a history of this early period, see L. Doro & H. SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR
(1978).
13. As to U.S. actions then and generally, see Nangle, Stratospheric Ozone: United States
Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons, 16 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 531 (1989).
14. As to Swedish actions then and generally, see Ahmadzai & Hedlund, A Profile of
Measures Taken in Sweden to Protect the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, 19 AMBio 341 (1990).
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the actions of a few states took pressure off other states to do likewise. In
other words, there was a free rider problem. Second, because lawmakers
and the public often could not judge the debate of experts, governments
began undertaking their own studies. These studies provided more im-
partial and authoritative sources of knowledge regarding the subject.
They would take time to complete, but their eventual release would pro-
foundly affect the debate. In some cases, such as in the United States, a
study would strongly support regulation efforts,15 while in other states
such as the United Kingdom, the study would have the opposite effect. 16
The national debates, as might be expected, resulted in basically one
of two outcomes: states generally inclined to greater regulation of CFCs,
and states basically still suspicious of the theory or at least of the need for
aggressive immediate action. Those states holding the former view in-
cluded Canada, Finland, Sweden, and the United States; the latter view
was held by much of continental Europe and the United Kingdom.17
The states holding these two views would coalesce into two groups (re-
spectively the Toronto group and the European Community (EC) group)
during the international negotiations which followed, and, would
roughly maintain their views and compositions until approximately 1987.
C. UNEP and the 1985 Vienna Framework Convention
Even as the national debates proceeded, the groundwork for an in-
ternational approach was laid. The United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP) in 1977 convened a meeting to begin the international
process. The meeting resulted in the adoption of the "World Plan of
Action on the Ozone Layer" and the establishment of a Global Coordi-
nating Committee on the Ozone Layer.
As U.S. leadership and concern over the ozone problem diminished
with the advent of the Reagan administration in 1981, UNEP, as a forum
for action, and the UNEP efforts to formulate an international response
under its Action Plan, in particular, moved to center stage.18 In 1981
15. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HALOCAREONS: ENVIRONMENTAL EV-
FECTS OF CHLOROFLUOROMETHANES (1976).
16. See STRATOSPHERIC RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., U.K. DEP'T OP THE ENV'T, RE-
PORT ON STRATOSPHERIC OZONE (1976).
17. This should not be taken to mean that the European Communities did nothing, but
rather that they were not prepared to do as much. As to actions by the European Community
in 1978, 1980, and 1982, see S.P. JOHNSON & G. CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 149-51 (International Environmental Law and Policy Se-
ries, 1989).
18. For discussions of the UNEP efforts up to and including adoption of the Vienna Con-
vention, see J. BRUNNtE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL
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UNEP established an Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
experts charged with the task of drafting a framework convention for the
protection of the ozone layer. A framework convention is a document
that aims not at substantive norms, but rather at establishment of the
institutional framework that will result in such norms. The Working
Group released the first draft of its work in October 1983, and several
further drafts were produced prior to the Vienna Conference in March
1985, which ultimately adopted a framework convention.
Adoption of the Vienna Convention was bittersweet, however, be-
cause several states had sought more from the Conference. In particular,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden circulated a draft protocol to the then
developing framework convention (the Nordic Annex) that would have
banned aerosol use of CFCs. Meanwhile, changes within the Environ-
mental Protection Agency under the Reagan administration led the
United States to join Canada in supporting the Nordic Annex. The EC
states opposed the approach taken by the Annex. Ultimately a compro-
mise was reached in the form of a Resolution of the Conference calling
for the states to reassemble for the purpose of concluding a protocol reg-
ulating CFCs.
D. A Growing Sense of Urgency and the 1987 Montreal Protocol 9
Even as work proceeded in anticipation of a second meeting to
adopt a protocol, two important trends were occurring. First, a British
research group in May 1985 announced that huge losses in Antarctic
ozone had occurred in the springs of 1982, 1983, and 1984.20 By late
summer 1985 American satellite measurements, free of certain previous
LAW AND REGULATION 225-53 (1988). Rummel-Bulska, The Protection of the Ozone Layer
Under the Global Framework Convention, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION: INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CO-OPERATION OF STATES 281 (C. Flinterman, B.
Kwiatkowska & J. Lammers eds. 1986); Sand, Protecting the Ozone Layer The Vienna Conven-
tion is Adopted, ENVIRONMENT, June 1985, at 18; Wasermann, UNEP: Protection of the Ozone
Layer, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 182 (1983).
19. For discussions of the period leading up to and immediately following the Montreal
Protocol, see Bankes, The Ozone Convention and Protoco" Further Steps Towards an
International Law of the Atmosphere, RESOURCES: NEWSL. OF THE CAN. INsr. OF
RESOURCES L., Spring 1988, at 1; Mintz, Keeping Pandora s Box Shut. A Critical Assement
of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, 20 INTER-Am. L R.
565 (1989).
20. Farmer, Gardiner & Shanklin, Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Sea-
sonal CLOJNO, Interaction, 315 NATURE 207 (1985). The data supporting this, however,
was limited in that measurements were taken at only two points in Antarctica. More impor-
tantly, for several months the data was not supported by American satellite measurements.
1991]
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interpretational errors, confirmed the British findings.21 The Antarctic
ozone hole created quite a stir in the scientific community since none of
the atmospheric models developed up to that point would have predicted
such an event. As a result, a massive international research effort was
undertaken to determine whether chlorine was responsible for the hole.
In this instance, there would not only be theories, but actual measure-
ments of the chlorine in the stratosphere over Antarctica would be taken.
In more general terms, the Antarctic hole was significant because, even
before the scientific community could confirm that chlorine was responsi-
ble for the hole, the public had what in its view was tangible and compre-
hensible evidence that humanity could fundamentally alter the Earth's
atmosphere. As the public increasingly voiced its concern, the states par-
ticipating in the international negotiations became increasingly receptive
not only to a ban on aerosol use, but, more generally, to across the board
phased reductions in CFC and halon consumption and production.
The second trend also facilitated the inclination to adopt across the
board phased reductions. Specifically, the major producers of CFCs had
come to believe that environmentally safe substitutes for CFCs existed,
and that it was for each of them in their individual interest to be the first
to develop and offer such substitutes. Although it was thought that such
substitutes would be several times more expensive than CFCs, it was also
thought that there would be a market for them in a world that called for
limits on the use of CFCs.22 Simultaneously, numerous large users of
CFCs moved to eliminate their reliance on such substances.23
For these reasons, the Montreal meeting was quite different from the
one held only two years earlier in Vienna in that virtually all of the inter-
ested parties were now in agreement that some amount of phased reduc-
tions was appropriate. Thus, even though the final report of the
international study of the Antarctic hole was not yet released,24 a Proto-
21. Stolarski, Krueger, Schoeberl, McPeters, Newman & Alpert, Nimbus 7Satellite Mea-
surements of the Springtime Antarctic Ozone Decrease, 322 NATURE 808 (1986).
22. See generally Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone De-
pletion, 29 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 793 (1989); Monastersky, Decline of the CFC Empire, 133 SC.
NEWS 234 (1988); Jones, In Search of the Safe CFCs, NEW SCIENTIST, May 26, 1988, at 56,
23. This trend continues apace. See, e.g., Northern Telecom to Phase Out CFCs This Year,
GLOBAL ENvrL. CHANGE REP., Jan. 18, 1991, at 6; AT&TEliminates CFC Use In USManu-
facturing Facility, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Jan. 4, 1991, at 6.
24. Preliminary reports of high chlorine concentrations by the international group in the
Antarctic stratosphere did not state that the chlorine was the conclusive cause of the hole. See
Shabecoff, Chlorine Levels Reported High Over Antarctica, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at CI,
col. 1. That is not to say, however, that there was no scholarly literature pointing to chlorine
as the cause. See, eg., McElroy, Salawitch, Wofsy & Logan, Reductions of Antarctic Ozone
Due to Synergistic Interactions of Chlorine and Bromine, 321 NATURE 759 (1986).
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col to the Vienna Convention calling for a fifty percent reduction in the
production and consumption of specified CFCs over an approximately
ten year period was adopted in Montreal in September 1987.
E. The Antarctic Ozone Hole and the Race to 1990 London
Adjustments and Amendments
But even as states adopted the Montreal Protocol in September
1987, two major concerns were present regarding the instrument. First,
the startling findings regarding the Antarctic ozone hole, officially con-
firmed only after the meeting in Montreal, had not been taken fully into
account in the Protocol. The negotiators were frustrated by their appar-
ent inability to draft regimes that kept up with the revelations emerging
from the scientific community. They had taken a step forward in Mon-
treal, but they felt that they were always two steps behind in their own
understanding of the problem, and at least two steps behind in their re-
sponse to the problem. Thus, there was a widespread feeling that the
Protocol was inadequate and would require revision.26
Second, the early indications by China and India, representing over
one-third of humanity, that they would not become parties to the Proto-
col because of its failure to provide adequate assistance to developing
countries, suggested that the international community might not be suffi-
ciently cohesive to comprehensively regulate the matter. As with green-
house gases, the international community was coming to realize that the
atmospheric changes theorized were evidence of the increasing burden of
a growing population on the planet, and that all such problems ulti-
mately boiled down to a combination of the number of people in the
world and the way they lived. It was apparent that any regime relating
to protection of the ozone layer must include highly populated states,
whether or not they presently were significant consumers or producers of
ozone-depleting substances. This development was particularly impor-
tant because it marked one of the few times that the industrialized world
needed the cooperation and participation of the Third World. This need
25. For articles anticipating the issues that were addressed in London, see Hand],
International Efforts to Protect the Global Atmosphere: A Case of Too Little, Too Late?, 1 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 250 (1990); Nanda, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Challenge for International
Environmental Law and Policy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 482 (1989); Rosencrmnz & Milhigan, CFC
Abatement" The Needs of Developing Countries, 19 AMBiO 312 (1990).
26. Regarding the Antarctic ozone hole, see NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
ANTARCTIC OZONE: INTIAL FINDINGS FROM PUNTA AREAS, CHILE (1988); NAT'L AERO-
NAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., OZONE TRENDS PANEL REPORT (1988); Stolarski, The Antarctic
Ozone Hole, 258 Sci. AM. 30 (1988).
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allowed the third world to raise development and international equity
concerns they believed had been unaddressed for too long.
As to the adequacy of the Montreal Protocol, planning for its ad-
justment and amendment began almost immediately. The political focus
on the global environment in general, and on the protection of the ozone
layer in particular, was intense from the 1987 Montreal Conference of
the Parties to the 1990 London Meeting of the ]?arties to the Montreal
Protocol. Of particular importance at this time, although less publicly
dramatic than the Antarctic ozone hole, was the release of a study by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency asserting that even assuming one
hundred percent global participation in the Protocol, the presence of
chlorine in the stratosphere would, by the year 2075, increase by a factor
of three.27
Amidst these new revelations, the entry into force of the Montreal
Protocol on January 1, 1989, was anticlimactic and hardly noticed. At
that time, one nation after another was calling for swifter and deeper cuts
in the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances, and in
some cases unilaterally adopting such measures. By the opening of the
London Meeting in June 1990, the negotiating parties were in agreement
not merely on accelerating the phased reductions, but on phasing out
entirely the substances specified by the Montrea Protocol.28 The pri-
mary issue was whether this phase out should be accomplished by the
year 1997 or the year 2000, the latter representing the adjustment ulti-
mately made to the Montreal schedules.2 9 Simultaneously, evolving sci-
entific knowledge regarding the threat posed by other substances led to
the consensus to amend the Protocol so that it would require phase outs
of other fully halogenated CFCs and carbon tetrachloride by the year
2000, and a phaseout of methyl chloroform by the year 2005.30 In-
creased understanding that the substitutes thought to exist at the time of
the Montreal Protocol might also be ozone-depleting3" and significant
27. J. HOFFMAN & M. GIBBS, FUTURE CONCENTRATIONS OF STRATOSPHERIC CIILO-
RINE AND BROMINE 2 (EPA Rep. 400/1-88/5, 1988). See also Bowman, Global Trends in
Total Ozone, 239 SCIENCE 48 (1988).
28. See Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Report of the Parties to
the Montreal Protocol on the Work of Its First Meeting, May 2, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
OzL.Pro.1/5, app. 1 (1989).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61.
30. As to methyl chloroform, see Montreal Protocol Should Include Methyl Chloroform,
Dutch Group Urges, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 53 (1990); U.S. Environmental Group Calls for
Phase-Out of Methyl Chloroform, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 53 (1990).
31. See, eg., Scientists Warn of Perils Posed by Substitute.; for CFCs, NEW SCIENTIST,
June 30, 1990, at 33.
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contributors to the greenhouse effect,32 resulted in the designation of
these substitutes as "transitional ozone-depleting substances," and in the
conclusion that the transitional substances should be phased out by the
year 2040, or, if possible, by the year 2020.
The apparent willingness of nonparticipating countries such as
China and India to operate outside of what they perceived to be an unjust
regime, was pitted against the reluctance of some developed countries
such as the United States, to construct new international structures, to
recognize a right of such countries to assistance and technology transfer,
and to encourage linkages between participation in regimes like the Pro-
tocol and recognition of the special situation of developing countries.
This reluctance was particularly strong since, at this same time, the de-
veloping world was making analogous demands for a global climate
change fund. 3 In time, the United States, virtually alone, opposed the
establishment of a financial mechanism. In May 1990 an apparently firm
refusal to offer new monies to help developing countries phase out ozone-
depleting chemicals threatened to derail the London Meeting planned for
late June and early July 1990. In mid-June, however, the United States
agreed to provide such monies,34 and shifted its focus to the mechanism
for the disbursement of such monies, pressing for a controlling voice in
how the fund would operate.35 Ultimately, the London meeting adopted
amendments to the Protocol that provided for technology transfer, and
established a fund under the supervision of a fourteen member committee
drawn from the developed and developing world.36 At the conclusion of
the London Meeting, the representatives of China and India indicated
their countries would sign the Protocol in 1992.37 The reference by these
delegates to the 1992 date is significant because it implies a further
linkage between their willingness to join the Protocol and the develop-
32. As to the adequacy of the transition period approach, see Scientist Says Interim CFC
Substitute Should Not Increase Stratospheric Chlorine, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 76 (1991).
This possibility is under particular scrutiny. See, &g., AFEASStudies Greenhouse Contribution
of CFC Alternatives, GLOBAL ENvrL. CHANGE RE !., Dec. 7, 1990, at 6.
For a tabular summary of the ozone-depleting potential, global warming potential, rela-
tive chlorine-loading potential, and reference lifetime of the various species of identified ozone-
depleting substances, see Rosemarin, Some Background on CFCs, 19 AMmio 280 (1990).
33. See generally Handl, supra note 25.
34. Milore, US Agrees Extra Funds to Safeguard Ozone Layer, NEW SCIENTIST, June 23,
1990, at 30.
35. Milne, Nations Approach Unity on Measures to Protect Ozone, NEw SCIENTsT, June
30, 1990, at 33.
36. See Rosencranz & Milligan, supra note 25, at 314.
37. Milne, CFC Clampdown Eases Pressure on the Ozone Layer, NEW SciENT=sT, July 7,
1990, at 21.
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ment of a more general climate trust fund at the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development to be held in Brazil in 1992.
F. The Task Ahead
After the London Meeting, two major areas of concern remain.
First, a number of groups assert that the Protocol even as adjusted and
amended does not go far enough. Although the list of controlled sub-
stances has been increased and, for the most part, total phaseouts have
been called for, an observer group at the London Meeting noted that the
phaseout periods-generally of ten years-will allow the production of
another seventeen million tons of ozone-depleting substances.38 Such ar-
guments arise amidst continued findings by the scientific community that
the ozone layer continues to deteriorate over Antarctica, 39 the Arctic, 40
and generally,4 and increasing evidence that the same substances that
deplete ozone are major contributors to global warming.4 2
Second, there is a growing sense that agreement upon the Protocol
and its adjustments and amendments, even if not completely satisfactory,
may have been an easier task than will be the facilitation, monitoring,
and enforcement of its implementation.43
38. See Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on the Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, para. 36, at 10, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 36, at 10
(1990) [hereinafter Report of the Second Meeting].
39. See, e.g., 1990 Ozone Hole Continues Into December, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP.,
Dec. 21, 1990, at 5; MonasterskyAntarctic Ozone Bottoms at Record Low, 138 Sc. Nnws 228
(1990) (Antarctic ozone layer hole reaches record proportions); Stevens, Ozone Losses In Arctic
Are Larger Than Expected, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at A25, col. 1; Ozone Depletion Quick-
ens at Both Poles, NEw SCIENTIsT Aug. 4, 1990, at 32.
40. See, e.g., Scientists Detect Hole in Ozone Above Three Scandinavian Nations, 14 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 68 (1991).
41. See, eg., Stevens, Ozone Loss Over U.S. is Found to be Twice as Bad as Predicted, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al, col. 1; Shabecoff, Scientists Report Faster Ozone Loss, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1990, § 1, at 13, col. 1 (Sunday late ed.) (10% reduction in ozone since 1967 over
middle latitudes).
42. See, e.g., Total CFC Ban Needed to Halt Global Warming, NEw SCIENTIST, Sept. 8,
1990 (CFCs will soon overtake carbon dioxide as the principal contributors to the increase in
the greenhouse effect); Leggett, Playing Roulette with the Atmosphere, NFW SCIENTIST, July 7,
1990, at 16 (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report indicts CFCs and many
of their "substitutes" because of their contribution to global warming).
43. Additional issues on the horizon are other ozone-depleting activities such as proposals
for stratospheric supersonic aircraft, see, e.g., Gribbin, Supersonic Plans 'Threaten Ozone
Layer' . ., NEw SCIENTiST, June 9, 1990, at 24, military use of ozone-depleting substances (a
category of use not clearly encompassed within the Protocol), and apparent difficulties in phas-
ing out CFC use by vessels, see, e.g., CFC Phaseout Schedules Present Special Problems for
Ships, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Dec. 7, 1990, at 7.
For discussions of how the international regime should be implemented in the United
States, see Chafee & Shimberg, Supplementing the Montreal Protocol. The Need for Domestic
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I. A RESTATEMENT OF THE REGIME
A. The Organization of the Regime
There are two main strands to the international organizational
scheme created by the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, as
amended and adjusted. First, there are state parties (to the Convention,
to the Protocol, and to the Protocol as amended) who meet on a regular
basis and who in smaller groups meet more regularly for particular tasks.
Second, there is a Secretariat which fulfills a number of duties, occasion-
ally through ad hoc working groups, assigned to it by the state parties in
the Convention and Protocol.
With respect to the parties to the ozone protection regime, there are
three formal groups of parties. First, the Vienna Convention establishes
a "Conference of the Parties."'  Second, although no special name such
as "Conference" is given, the term "Parties" in the Montreal Protocol
means only the parties to that Protocol.45  Third, because the Protocol
was amended in London, there may be slight divergences between those
states party to the Protocol and those states party to the Protocol as
amended. Inasmuch as a party to the Protocol or the Protocol as
amended must also be a party to the Convention, the parties to the Pro-
tocol or the Protocol as amended are subgroups of the "Conference of
the Parties" to the Convention.
Both the Convention and the Protocol provide that there shall be
regular meetings of the parties to the respective instruments." As a
practical matter, these groups of parties coordinate their meetings, and
the Montreal Protocol generally calls for the meetings of Parties to the
Protocol to be held in conjunction with the meetings of the Conference of
the Parties to the Convention.47 The primary distinction between the
groups of parties thus reduces their standing to vote upon, or have an
official voice regarding, certain issues. In particular, only Parties to the
Protocol, and not those who are solely members of the Conference of the
Legislation, 19 AMBIO 310 (1990); Hahn & McGartland, The Political Economy ofInstrument
Choice: An Examination of the US Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 Nw. U.L
REV. 592 (1989).
44. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, para. 1, at 12, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1531.
45. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 2, reprinted in 26 IL.M. at 1551. Arti-
cle 1(2) is unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, at 2.
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, para. 1, at 15, reprinted in 26 I.LM. at 1531;
Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 11, reprinted in 26 I.LM. at 1557.
47. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 11, reprinted in 26 I.L. M. at 1557. Article 11 is
not altered in this regard in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, at
14.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Parties to the Convention, can vote on amendments to the Protocol.41
Similarly, membership on the Executive Committee, which is responsible
for the Multilateral Fund established by the London Amendments to the
Protocol is limited to Parties to the Protocol as amended. 49
Although there are various groups of parties, there is only one Sec-
retariat for the Convention and the Protocol. The Secretariat functions
are carried out by the UNEP and, in this sense, the Vienna Convention
can be seen as merely formalizing the coordinating role held by UNEP
before the Vienna Conference.50 The duties of the Secretariat are set
forth both in the Convention and the Protocol, and both of these docu-
ments allow for the Conference of Parties to the Convention or the Par-
ties to the Protocol to assign the Secretariat other functions.51
Finally, the organizational structure created by the Convention and
Protocol necessarily has extensive relations with two other organiza-
tional clusters. First, in order to provide a better foundation for the
timely making of policy, there are relations with the public international
scientific community (namely, the World Meteorological Organization
and the World Health Organization), leading national scientific agencies,
and private international scientific organizations. Second, in order to
provide financial and technical assistance, there are relations with organi-
zations such as the World Bank.
B. The Lawmaking Process
A number of innovative steps in lawmaking are contained in the
Montreal Protocol. The general implications of these steps are discussed
in Part III; the following discussion describes the formal structure of the
regime as it presently exists.
The Protocol anticipates that continued revision may be necessary,
and calls for the Parties periodically to assess the adequacy of the meas-
ures taken in the Protocol.52 The Protocol provides that the parties, on
48. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 9, paras. 2, 4, at 18-19, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at
1532-33.
49. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 10, at 12-13.
50. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 7, para. 2, at 18, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1532,
UNEP's designation as the agency responsible for secretariat functions was only "on an In-
terim basis." Id.
51. As to the duties assigned, see Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 7, at 17-18, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. at 1532; Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12, reprinted in 26 I.M, at
1558-59. Article 12 is unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note
4, at 14.
52. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 6, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556, Article 6 is
basically unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, at 10.
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the basis of such an assessment, may decide to adjust the reductions
called for in the controlled substances, and, if the parties are unable to
reach agreement on such adjustments, two-thirds majority adoption of
adjustments shall be binding upon all Parties to the Protocol.53 Thus,
the Parties to the Protocol have limited legislative power in this area with
an objector's recourse being withdrawl generally from the Protocol.
Some of the actions taken at the London Meeting were adjustments.
In contrast to this legislative-like adjustment process, there is also
the more commonly encountered amendment process that becomes bind-
ing only upon those states who accept such amendments. In this regard,
it is particularly important to see that although the parties may make
adjustments to the controlled substances already designated, they cannot
use an adjustment to designate a new controlled substance.54 As a conse-
quence, the actions taken at the London Meeting were in part also
amendments. Many of the amendments relate to the creation of a finan-
cial mechanism, but many others relate to the addition of new controlled
substances. The crucial implication, however, is that since amendments
must be consented to in order to have application to any particular party,
a confusing array of regimes may arise.55
C. The Normative Scheme
1. The Obligation to Phase Out Designated Ozone-Depleting
Chemicals
The basic regulatory approach of the Montreal Protocol in 1987 was
to require the Parties to the Protocol to reduce their production and con-
sumption of five chlorofluorocarbons specified in Group I to Annex A of
the Protocol, and three halons specified in Group II to Annex A of the
53. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 9, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1553-54. In
the Montreal Protocol, the two-thirds majority must also represent 50% of the total consump-
tion of the controlled substances by the Parties. In the Protocol as amended, this requirement
is changed to a two-thirds majority that reflects both a majority of those states whose special
situation as developing states is recognized under the Protocol as amended, London Amend-
ments, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1, at 9, and a majority of those states that do not fit within this
category. In this way, the Protocol better reflects not only the interests of those who presently
consume CFCs, but also those who forgo developing such use.
54. As to the amendment process generally, see Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 9,
at 18-19, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1532-33. As to the characterization of designating new
controlled substances as amendments, see Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 10,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1554, as originally drafted and as clarified by the London
amendments.
55. See Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 38, dec. 11/16, at 18 (recommending that
the Conference of Parties to the Vienna Convention undertake to consider how to expedite the
amendment procedure for protocols).
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Protocol. The London Adjustments to the Protocol accelerated this
timetable and deepened the cuts by requiring the parties to phase out
production and consumption entirely by the year 2000. The scheduled
reductions required under both the Montreal Protocol and the London
Adjustments for the Group I CFCs are represented in Figure 1, while the
scheduled reductions required for halons are represented in Figure 2.
The London Amendments to the Protocol added new chemicals to
the regulatory scheme, specifying them in a new Annex B. A phaseout
by the year 2000 is required for other fully halogenated CFCs56 and for
carbon tetrachloride,57 while a phaseout of methyl chloroform is required
by the year 2005.58 These scheduled phaseouts are represented in Figure
3.
As illustrated by Figures 1, 2, and 3, the scheduled reductions, lead-
ing ultimately to phaseouts, are expressed in terms of percentages of cal-
culated national levels of consumption and production in either 1986, in
the case of the substances originally regulated by the Protocol, or in
1989, for the substances added to the scope of the Protocol by the
London Amendments. The national calculated levels thus are particu-
larly important bench marks for the purpose of the regulatory scheme. It
is important to note how the calculated level and the reductions in that
level relate to baskets of substances. Group I of Annex A, for example,
designates five different CFCs. It is up to each state to decide how they
will mix reductions of the five so as to meet any particular scheduled
reduction in the overall calculated level. To avoid false incentives in this
scheme, the formula for the calculated level places all of the various des-
ignated chemicals on the same level by multiplying the amount of each
chemical produced, imported, and exported by its "ozone-depleting po-
tential," such potentials also being specified in the annex.59
The use of national calculated levels is also significant because it
inherently gives value to historical usage and avoids the difficult issue of
equitably allocating between states a limited resource, the right to emit
ozone-depleting substances. Thus, the United States could be viewed as
particularly advantaged under the Montreal Protocol since a fifty percent
reduction in its production and consumption would still leave it with a
disproportionate per capita share of such use. This significance of course
56. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 2C, at 4.
57. Id. art. 2D, at 4-5.
58. Id. art. 2E, at 5-6.
59. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1554. Article 3 is
basically unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, at 6.
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diminished greatly when the Protocol was adjusted and amended so as to
require phaseouts rather than mere reductions.
Two constructive exceptions to the reductions schedule are ex-
pressed in terms of the calculated level. First, any party may transfer to
another party any portion of its calculated level of production, so long as
such transfers do not cause the parties involved to exceed collectively the
production limit applicable to them as a group.' Second, if a party had
contracted for a production facility prior to September 16, 1987, or pro-
vided for such expansion in national legislation prior to January 1, 1987,
then that party may add such production to its calculated level.61
2. Recognition of the Special Situation of Developing Countries
The special situation of certain developing countries is recognized
through the possibility of a delayed phaseout schedule for such countries.
These special provisions apply to any party "that is a developing country
and whose annual calculated level of consumption... is less than 0.3
kilograms per capita .... 62 The delay works in two ways. First, these
parties are allowed to exceed the target percentage reduction at any point
in the schedule by a specified percentage of their initial calculated level if
such action is necessary in order to satisfy "basic domestic needs." 63 Sec-
ond, such developing countries, in order to meet basic domestic needs,
also are entitled to delay at every point their compliance with the sched-
ule of reductions leading to phase outs by a period of ten years."
60. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 5, at 2. The London Amendment to
this paragraph greatly simplified and perhaps broadened somewhat what originally was termed
"industrial rationalization." See CFC Trading Under the Montreal ProtocoL How Does it
Work?, GLOBAL ENVTh. CHANGE RP., Dec. 21, 1990, at 1.
61. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 6, at 3. The facility must have been
completed by December 31, 1990, and such production must not raise the party's annual cal-
culated level of consumption above 0.5 kilograms per capita. The London Amendment to this
paragraph does not reflect any significant alteration in the original provision. This provision
was intended to address central planning concerns of socialist states; it is unclear what practi-
cal significance it has, particularly after the changes that have occurred in what was the social-
ist world.
62. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1555. Arti-
cle 5(1) is basically unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4,
at 9.
63. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 2, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1552-53. Article 2 in
this regard is basically unaltered in its appearances in Articles 2, 2A-2E in the Protocol as
amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, at 3-6.
64. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 5, reprinted in 26 I.LM. at 1555. Article 5 in
this regard is basically unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note
4, at 9.
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3. The Resolution of States to Act Beyond the Requirements of
the Protocol as Adjusted and Amended
It is important to recognize that the reduction schedule set forth in
the Protocol as adjusted and amended represents only the baseline. A
number of states have accepted greater obligations, 65 and the Protocol
urges the parties to act with greater dispatch when possible. Particularly
significant in this regard is the Declaration at the London Meeting by
thirteen developed countries of "[tiheir firm determination . . . to
phaseout the production and consumption of all fully halogenated
chlorofluorocarbons controlled by the Montreal Protocol, as adjusted
and amended, as soon as possible but no later than 1997."16 Similarly,
all the parties at the London Meeting resolved to do the following: re-
frain from using certain other halons except for essential applications;
use "transitional substances with a low ozone-depleting potential, such as
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs)," with great care and with a view to
their replacement by nonozone-depleting and more environmentally suit-
able alternatives no later than 2040 and, if possible, no later than 2020;
phase out production and consumption of methylchloroform as soon as
possible; and express appreciation to those parties that have already
taken measures more stringent and broader in scope than those required
by the Protocol.67
D. Encouraging Participation and Facilitating Implementation
From the beginning, it was recognized that the shared nature of the
ozone-depletion problem required widespread participation in the regime
to be established by the Convention and Protocol. Encouragement of
participation by developing countries, in particular India and China, re-
quired mechanisms to aid implementation of the regime by those coun-
tries. Thus, encouragement of participation and facilitation of
implementation were and remain linked.
The regime encourages participation in a number of ways. First,
65. As to actions by the European Community, see Council of Ministries Favors Regda-
tion to Phase Out Chlorofluorocarbons by 1977, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 3 (1991); EC Envl-
ronment Ministers Agree on CFC Phaseout, Vehicle Emission Cuts, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANCE
REP., Jan. 4, 1991, at 3. As to actions by the Federal Republic of Germany, see Strengthened
German CFC Law Goes Before Parliament, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Jan. 18, 1991, at
3. As to actions by political subdivisions in the United States, see State and Local CFC Laws
on the Rise in US, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Dec. 21, 1990, at 4.
66. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 38, paras. 48-49, at 20-21. The countries
were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Fin-
land, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
67. Id. Annex VII.
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because the reduction schedules are tied to either 1986 or 1989 levels of
consumption and production, there is no advantage to waiting to join the
regime. Second, although the parties to the regime during the phaseout
periods may trade the controlled substances with one another, the Proto-
col, as adjusted and amended, progressively restricts trade involving con-
trolled substances between parties and nonparties. 68 Thus, for example,
by January 1, 1993, the parties, having agreed upon a list of products
containing the controlled substances specified in the Montreal Proto-
col,69 shall bar the import of those products from any state not party to
the Protocol.70
Third, the Protocol not only attempts to limit the advantages of re-
maining outside, but for developing countries, also provides incentives to
join. The Montreal Protocol originally was vague on this point, provid-
ing that the parties, recognizing the particular needs of developing coun-
tries, "shall... cooperate in promoting technical assistance to facilitate
participation in and implementation of this Protocol."'" In response to
the positions of India and China in particular, more specific and detailed
provisions for financial assistance and technology transfer were adopted
at the London Meeting.72
E. Noncompliance, Enforcement, and Dispute Settlement
Thus far, the Parties to the Convention and the Protocol have been
concerned primarily with elaboration of and formal participation in the
regime. As a result, enforcement procedures at this point are not partic-
ularly developed.
The key monitoring and enforcement device at present is the re-
quirement for parties to provide to the Secretariat statistics on produc-
tion, on imports and exports to parties and nonparties, and on amounts
destroyed or recycled as feedstocks.7 3 Such reports will aid Secretariat
68. See generally London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 4, at 7-9.
69. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 10, at 19-20, reprinted in 26 LLM. at 1533
(procedures elaborating this list).
70. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 3, at 8. The London Amendments to
article 4 primarily attempt to adapt that article to the addition of the new Annex B.
71. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1557.
72. See generally London Amendments, supra note 4, arts. 10, 10A, at 12-14. Under Deci-
sion I1/8A taken at the London Meeting, an "Interim Financial Mechanism" of quite similar
design was established for the period January 1, 1991, to December 31, 1993, or "until such
time as the Financial Mechanism is established." Report ofthe Second Meeting, supra note 38,
dec. II/8 A, at 12. See generally Handl, supra note 25; Rosencranz & Milligan, supra note 25.
73. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 7, at 10-11. The amendment to Article 7
expanded upon the original reporting requirement by recognizing the need also to follow
amounts destroyed or recycled as feedstocks.
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and party monitoring, and will also further nongovernmental organiza-
tion involvement since such data is not regarded as confidential. 74 Un-
fortunately, not all parties have made such reports, or have submitted
incomplete reports. The London meeting of the parties, noting these re-
porting difficulties, established an ad hoc group of experts to consider the
reasons for the difficulties and to recommend solutions.75
Investigatory and dispute settlement provisions are quite limited.
The Convention, with application to the Protocol,76 provides that in the
event of a dispute concerning interpretation or application of a provision,
the parties (1) shall negotiate; (2) failing that, seek the good offices of, or
request mediation by, a third party; and (3) failing that, submit the dis-
pute to conciliation. 7 The parties, in accepting 'the Convention also may
declare that they accept as a means of dispute settlement either arbitra-
tion or submission to the International Court of Justice, or both.71
Against that backdrop, the Parties to the Protocol have been considering
procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining noncompliance
and for treatment of parties found to be in noncompliance.79 Interim
noncompliance provisions adopted at the London Meeting essentially
provide for parties with reservations regarding implementation by other
parties to report such concerns in writing to the Secretariat. The Secreta-
riat shall transmit the submission to an Implementation Committee es-
tablished by these same interim procedures, and that Committee shall
consider the record with a view to securing an amicable resolution."
The Committee shall report on its work to the Meeting of the Parties and
the parties "may ... decide upon and call for steps to bring about full
compliance .. . including measures to assist the Party's compliance
,,81
IV. THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWMAKING
Reflection on the international effort to protect the stratospheric
74. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 38, dec. 11/9, at 12.
75. Id.
76. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 14, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1559. Article 14 is
unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, at 14.
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 11, at 20-21, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1533-34.
78. Id. art. 11, para. 3, at 21, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1534. At the time of the Vienna
Convention, 16 countries expressed their regret at the absence of a compulsory provision for
the settlement of disputes. See id. at 35, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1535.
79. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 8, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556.
80. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 38, dec. 11/5, at 12; see also Id. Annex III,
81. Id. Annex III.
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ozone layer illuminates the emerging structure of international environ-
mental lawmaking. International environmental lawmaking is different
from international lawmaking in general in at least three respects. First,
environmental lawmaking must be conducted amidst great uncertainty
about the reality, cause, and extent of the problem. Second, because the
nature of environmental problems such as ozone depletion requires con-
certed action, it is necessary that at least the major contributors to the
problem, present and future, be parties to the regime. Third, because it is
difficult to separate environmental problems from one another and from
development concerns generally, environmental lawmaking runs the risk
of either being unmanageable or not system-oriented. This section dis-
cusses each of these differences in turn.
A. Lawmaking Amidst Uncertainty: The Process as the Solution
We ordinarily might expect that states seeking to address an interna-
tional problem would work towards a diplomatic conference where a
treaty addressing an issue could be negotiated. Without in any way im-
plying that this "ordinary" situation is easy, the international environ-
mental context can be far more difficult because the views of the parties
as to the nature of the environmental problem not only can be quite dif-
ferent, but moreover, the knowledge of all environmental problems is
likely incomplete even though evolving. In the "ordinary" context a cen-
tral task in the lawmaking effort is to improve communication between
the parties so that they may better understand each other's objectives and
concerns. In negotiations concerning environmental matters, however,
there is the added and quite different task of the parties seeking to dis-
cover precisely what the environment requires. In this sense, the envi-
ronment is an unobtrusive, but central presence in the negotiations. It is
a party that does not volunteer information, but may answer questions if
asked correctly. It is also a party that refuses to negotiate.
In the case of stratospheric ozone depletion, the international com-
munity initially confronted great debate as to whether there was a prob-
lem at all, followed by debate regarding the extent of the problem. As
observed by many scholars in the past several decades, the nature of
many environmental problems requires action by the relevant commu-
nity before it has proof of the theory. In other words, the international
community, despite uncertainty about the theory, must act to confront
the danger indicated by the theory. Moreover, it must act knowing that
its knowledge will continue to evolve and suggest further actions. These
aspects of uncertainty and evolving knowledge lead to two major differ-
ences in international environmental lawmaking efforts from lawmaking
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efforts generally. Both of these differences evidence an emphasis on an
ongoing process of lawmaking rather than, as ordinarily the case, the one
time negotiation of a treaty at a particular conference.
The first difference is the explicit incorporation of scientific inquiry
into the lawmaking process. Dealing with the uncertainty necessarily
present in environmental problems requires that the process not only in-
crease the shared knowledge of the parties, but that such knowledge also
accurately reflect the state of scientific understanding of the problem.
This requires much greater cooperation between the lawmaking commu-
nity attempting to draft a response and the scientific community seeking
to understand the phenomena. Imbedding this scientific effort in an in-
ternational organizational structure or in international efforts that coor-
dinate national efforts increases the perceived legitimacy, and hence
shared nature, of the resulting description of the problem. Making the
scientific inquiry an integral part of an ongoing lawmaking process serves
both to educate the lawmakers and to speed up the incorporation of such
knowledge into the process. In the case of the ozone regime, the Proto-
col institutionalizes this cooperation by requiring the convening of "ap-
propriate panels of experts" (scientific, environmental, technical, and
economic) at least one year before the parties meet to reassess the suffi-
ciency of the Protocol's controls on ozone-depleting substances.8 2
The second major difference is that the lawmaking effort that ac-
commodates evolving knowledge through the establishment of an ongo-
ing process of lawmaking continuously incorporates new knowledge and
revises previous responses. In this sense, the Protocol calls for the parties
to periodically "assess the control measures provided for in Article 2 on
the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical, and economic
information." 3 Thus, we see a transition from a one-conference effort to
an ongoing process, and from "two steps behind" to action on the basis
of evolving knowledge. In this sense, cooperation and education are rec-
ognized as important aspects of the lawmaking process in the environ-
mental area. For all these reasons, the solution to a threat such as ozone
depletion is not the particular requirements of the Montreal Protocol or
the London Adjustments and Amendments to the Protocol. Rather, the
solution is the process which yielded the Protocol and which already
looks ahead to the next adjustments and amendments.
82. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 6, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556. Article 6 is
basically unaltered in the Protocol as amended. London Amendments, supra note 4, art, 6, at
10.
83. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3, art. 6, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1556.
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B. Consensual Lawmaking on Transcendent Problems
International environmental lawmaking is also distinct in that the
nature of many environmental problems requires that at least those coun-
tries primarily contributing, or potentially contributing, to the problem
participate in the regime. The environmental regime is dictated by the
planet in the sense that the earth is not willing to negotiate the terms of a
solution. In the previous section, it was asserted that states must negoti-
ate a regime despite the fact that they are uncertain as to what precisely
the earth requires. This section points to the need to encourage partici-
pation in global environmental regimes by at least those states which are,
or potentially are, significant contributors to the problem.
In encouraging participation, the tools of the lawmaker are sticks
and carrots. In other words, states either may be penalized for not join-
ing the regime or rewarded for doing so. In the ozone protection regime,
developing countries were encouraged to join through the recognition of
their special needs. Moreover, although there are no sticks per se, the
treaty does attempt to prevent those who remain outside from benefitting
by doing so. First, there is no advantage in waiting to join the treaty
since the baseline calculation from which reductions are to be made is
fixed. Second, there is no trade advantage in remaining outside the con-
vention since it restricts members from trading in areas involving the
regulated substances with those outside the regime.
The more subtle implication of needing widespread participation, as
discussed above, was the demand by China, India, and others for a
linkage between their agreement to participate in the regime and satisfac-
tion of other concerns, particularly, development assistance for the Third
World. In the case of stratospheric ozone protection, linkage ultimately
was made in the London amendments. The amendments provide for
technology transfer and establish a fund to aid implementation of the
Protocol by facilitating nonozone-depleting paths for growth in develop-
ing countries. The scale of linkage in the greenhouse gas negotiations
will be an order of greater magnitude. The lawmaking risk presented by
issue linkage is that it likely causes the scope of the agreement to in-
crease. Moreover, the agreement, as a result, may embody compromises
on linked issues and thus have the flavor of a package deal. This line of
reasoning raises for some observers the possibility that greenhouse nego-
tiations will bog down as did the Law of the Sea negotiations, and like
the Law of the Sea, will result ultimately in an agreement that is too rigid
because of the delicate balancing that is required. However, the sense of
urgency which is associated with climate change did not exist with the
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Law of the Sea issue. In this sense, the urgency of climate change likely
will push negotiations along despite the recognition of the special needs
of developing countries. Other possibly even broader linkages to North-
South questions, however, are perhaps best avoided so as to keep man-
ageable the already broad scope of negotiations.
C. The Tension Between Manageability of NegDtiations and
Systemic Thinking
One of the first lessons of environmental studies is the need to ap-
proach the environment as a system, an indivisible process. The
lawmaker, however, can not approach the development of an environ-
mentally sound relationship between humanity and the world all at once.
Rather, negotiations must be limited so that the number of issues and
interests involved remain at a manageable level. The danger with the
slicing off of what appears to be a somewhat separable and manageable
problem, however, is that systemic thinking may be lost. The question
thus becomes how to best reconcile the need for manageable negotiations
with the need for holistic thinking.
In the case of ozone depletion, the negotiations, at least initially, in
moving to address the depletion problem did not consider whether their
solutions might rest upon assumptions that would exacerbate the green-
house gas problem. In particular, the reductions in CFC and halon use
agreed to in Montreal were premised in part on the belief that ozone-safe
substitutes existed. But, as already mentioned, not only did it later turn
out that these substances also were ozone depleting, they also came to be
seen as highly efficient greenhouse gases.
In this regard, I suggest that the regime negotiators take care to
identify the major scientific, technical, environmental, and economic as-
sumptions underlying major policy choices so that the corresponding
panels of experts in these areas, already an integral part of the process,
might examine such assumptions against their more general knowledge,
and hence, in a more systemic fashion.
V. CONCLUSION
In the little over fifteen years since the theory of ozone depletion was
put forward, the international community moved relatively quickly to
order the phaseout of key ozone-depleting substances by the year 2000,
In doing so, the community formed an international regime, despite un-
certainty, in relation to a problem whose solution requires near universal
participation. Scholarly elaboration of the lessons of that effort is needed
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so that the more difficult upcoming negotiations regarding greenhouse
gases may be fruitful. Among others things, an international environ-
mental lawmaking process should:
(1) address uncertainty and the evolving nature of one's knowledge by
explicitly viewing such lawmaking as an ongoing process within
which knowledge is advanced and becomes shared through the im-
bedding of scientific, technical, environmental, and economic ex-
pertise in the organizational regime;
(2) encourage participation, yet avoid unrelated linkages, by address-
ing related interests of special groups of states and by denying any
benefit to those remaining outside the regime; and
(3) resolve the tension of manageability of negotiations and systemic
thinking by the identification of factual assumptions underlying
major policy directions and by placing such assumptions also
within the scope of inquiry of the expert's committees imbedded in
the process.
Finally, I stress that even as the international lawmaking process
develops, we must remember that another whole phase, that of interna-
tional and national implementation of this international normative con-
struct, remains to be addressed.
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